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BANKS AND BANKING-BANK'S RIGHT TO SET-OFF-NOTES NOT YET
DUE.-HAYDEN ET AL. V. CITIZENS' BANK OF BALTIMORE ET AL., 87 ATL.
REP., 672 (MD.),--Held, that a bank holding unmatured notes of a corpor-
ation when it goes into a receiver's hands may set off the notes against the
deposit to the corporation's credit in the bank.
The general rule is that a bank has a general lien on all moneys and
funds of a depositor in its possession for the balance of the general ac-
count. Marsh v. Oneida Bank, 34 Barb. (N. Y.), 298; Scott v. Franklin,
15 East, 427. This is true not only of the general deposit of the customer,
but also of any business papers, as notes or bills, belonging to him, which
he has intrusted to the bank for collection. Ex parte Pease, 1 Rose, 232.
But funds deposited for a special purpose, known to the- bank, cannot be
withheld from that purpose and applied to a debt due the bank from the
depositor. Brown v. Say. Inst., 137 Mass., 262; Wyckoff v. Anthony, 90
N. Y., 442; First Nat'l Bank v. Peltz, 176 Pa. St., 513. The decisions are
in conflict as to the right of a bank to assert a lien for the benefit of notes
which it holds, but which are not yet due. In some jurisdictions, if the
depositor becomes insolvent before the maturity of the debt, the bank
may, as against him or his assignee, apply the deposit to the payment of
its claim. Georgia Seed Co. v. Talmadge, 96 Ga., 254; Ky. Flour Co. v.
Bank, 90 Ky., 225; Deininon v. Bank, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 194. In Pennsyl-
vania the right of lien in such cases is sustained on the ground that the
insolvency operates to mature all debts. Stewart v. Bank, 6 Wkly. Notes
Cas., 399. This doctrine has received the approval of the Supreme Court
of the United States. See Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S., 506, 510. A contra
rule prevails in other jurisdictions, where it is held that, in order to assert
such lien or set-off, the debt must be due. Bank v. Proctor, 98 Ill., 558;
Bradley v. Smiths' Sons, 98 Mich., 449; Kortjohn v. Bank, 63 Mo. App.,
166; Bank v. Mahon, 78 S. C., 408; Oatinan v. Bank, 77 Wisc., 501. This
is on the ground that at law a debt in futuro cannot be set off against a
debt in praesenti. Nat'l Bank v. Ritzinger, 20 Ill. App., 27. In New York
this broad rule is qualified, and it is held that insolvency sometimes moves
equity to grant a set-off which would not be allowed at law. Jordan v.
Bank, 74 N. Y., 467. The same conflict of authority exists as to the right
of a bank to apply a deceased depositor's account to a note not due at
the time of the death of such depositor. See Natl Bank v. Green, 45 N. J.
Eq., 546, and Hodgin v. Bank, 124 N. C., 540, where such application is
allowed where the depositor's estate is insolvent, and for the contra rule
see Appeal of Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 48 Pa. St., 57. Under sec-
tion 68 of the Bankruptcy Law of 1898, unmatured claims against a bank-
rupt are the subject of set off in favor of the holder thereof. Frank v.
Nat'l Bank, 182 N. Y., 264; Re Glass Co., 135 Fed., 77. Contra, Irish v.
Citizens' Trust Co., 163 Fed., 880. Where courts of law and equity have
been combined, the better rule would seem to be that laid down in the
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principal case, even though technically the debt is not due, on the ground
that equitable considerations require such off-sets.
BILLS AND NOTEs-TRANSFER-CNSIDERATION-PRE-EXISTING INDEBT-
EDNESS.-MALONE V. NATIONAL BANK OF COIMERCE OF KANSAS CITY, MO.,
162 S. W. (Tsx.), 369.The Sheffield Gas Power Co. was indebted to
appellee and indorsed over to appellee appellant's notes in part payment of
the debt and was given credit for the amount by appellee. Held, that
there was sufficient consideration to make appellee a bona fide holder for
value.
The rule of the law merchant was that one who took negotiable paper
in discharge of a pre-existing debt was deemed a holder'for value and in
due course. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U. S., 1; May v. Qunnby, 66 Ky., 96;
Brown v. Leavitt, 31 N. Y., 113. A limitation was imposed in a few juris-
dictions to the effect that one who took in part payment of a pre-existing
debt was not deemed a bona fide holder for value. Lyon w. Fitch, 18
N. Y. Supp., 867. It was also held that the discharge of the debt was
essential, the taking as mere security did not constitute value. Bay v. Cod-
dington, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.), 54; Martin v. Banks, 94 Tenn., 176. But
the better rule was that it made no difference whether note was taken as
security or in discharge. Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. v. National Bank o-
Republic, 102 U. S. ,14. Art. III, sec. 51, of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, under which the principal case is decided, says that "an'antecedent
or pre-existing debt cohstitutes value." 'Under this clause the decisions
are almost uniform in. holding not only the discharge of the debt to -be
value but also the taking as security. Williams v. Usher, 123 Ky.. 66;
Brooks v. Sullivan, 129 N. C., 190. But New York would yet limit the
holding of the principal case to a case of absolute discharge .oI the ante-
cedent debt. Sutherland v. Mead, 80 N. Y. Supp., 504.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-SALE OF LAND__-NICHOLS V. BURCIAM ET Al..,
143 N. W. (MicH.), 647.-Held, that a receipt given td the purchaser for
a sum received on the purchase price of land, is not sufficient under the
statute of frauds as a memorandum -of the sale of land; where it did not
fix a time for making payments.
The fourth section of the English Statute of Frauds provides.that no
action shall be brought on the contracts enumerated, "unless the agree-
ment * * * or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing."
See 29 Car. II (1676), c. 3. Similar provisions are to be found in the
statutes of the different states in this country. As to .the memorandum
required, the rule is that it need not formally recite its purpose as a note
of the agreement. It is sufficient if it states the agreement with clear-
ness. Davenport Fir't Church v. Swanson, 100 Ill. App., 39; Mckanus V.
Boston, 171 Mass., 152; Wade v. Curtiss, 96 Me., 309. So, a. receipt for
money paid may be a sufficient memorandum. Williams v.. Norris, 95
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U. S., 444; Evans v. Prothero, 1 De G., M. & G., 572. But it is the general
rule that to satisfy the statute a memorandum must state the contract
with such certainty that its essentials can be known from the note itself, or
by a reference contained in it to some other writing, without recourse to
parol proof. Oakinan v. Rodgers, 120 Mass., 214; Gault v. Stormont, 51
Mich., 636; Browne, Stat. of Fr. (5th ed.), sec. 371 a. The express stipu-
lations of the oral contract must appear. Thus, the price agreed to be
paid for the property must be stated, where the oral contract contained
such a term. Grace v. Denison, 114 Mass., 16; McElroy v. Buck, 35 Mich.,
434; Williams v. Norris, supra. So, too, where credit is given, it must be
set out, as it has been held to be an essential term of the contract of sale.
Morton v. Dean, 13 Met. (Mass.), 385; Davis v. Shields, 26 Wend. (N. Y.),
341. The memorandum need not state any time or place for the perform-
ance of the contract, in the absence of such stipulation in the oral contract.
Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. (U. S.), 446; Kriete v. Myer
& Co., 61 Md., 558. It would seem from the above that the rule in the
principal case is based on sound logic, for the purpose of the statute, viz.,
to prevent fraud and perjury, can best be accomplished when all the essen-
tial terms of oral contract are stated in the written memorandum. That
time of payment is such an essential term of a contract, see Nelson v.
Shelby Mfg. & Impr. Co., 96 Ala., 515; Elliot v. Barrett, 144 Mass., 256;
O'Donell v. Leeman, 43 Me., 158; Harvey v. Burhans, 91 Wis., 348.
INSURANcE-LinE INSURANE-CoNDITIONs -EDMONDS V. MUTUAL LiFE
INSURANCE Co., 144 N. W. (S. D.), 718-The application for a life insur-
ance policy provided that for the period of one year following the date of
issue the insured should not engage in certain extra hazardous occupa-
tions. The policy provided that it was free from restrictions after one
year from date of issue. The insured engaged in a prohibited occupatio,
before the expiration of one year. Held, such occupation did not wholly
avoid the policy, but merely suspended it while the insured was engaged in
the extra-hazardous occupation, or, if the prohibited occupation contin-
ued, up to the time when by the terms of the policy the restriction was
removed.
Forfeitures of insurance policies are not favored and conditions which
work forfeitures should be strictly construed against the party making
them. May on Insurance (3rd ed.), sec. 367. They are enforced only
when there is the clearest evidence that a forfeiture was meant by the
stipulation of the parties. Helne v. Phila. Ins. Co., 61 Pa., 107; Phenix
Ins. Co. v. Holcombe, 57 Neb., 622. A more liberal construction will be
given in favor of the beneficiary with respect to conditions subsequent
than to conditions precedent to the loss. Woodmen Accd. Ass'n v. Pratt,
62 Neb., 673. If under all the circumstances the insured has exercised
due diligence to comply with conditions subsequent arid has not been neg-
ligent, by the great weight of authority the policy continues in force and
the insured or beneficiary may recover. Simmons v. Traveller's Ass'n,
112 N. W. (Neb.), 365; Foster v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 75 N; W.
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(Wis.), 69; Simmons v. Traveller's Ass'n, 71 N. W. (Ia.), 254. There are
however some authorities contra. Gamble v. Accident Ins. Co., 4 Ir. R. C.
L., 204; Patton v. Employer's Assi. Corp., 20 Law Rep. (Irish), 93. In
policies containing a forfeiture clause, if the insured committed suicide
the courts have very generally refused to enforce the forfeiture clause on
the ground that such could not have been intended by the parties. Lewine
v. Supreme Lodge of K. of P., 122 MIo. App., 547; K. T. & M. Indemnity
Co. v. Jarmon, 104 Fed., 638 There is a conflict of authority as to tht
effect on an insurance policy of a temporary breach of condition. Some
courts hold that the policy is merely suspended during a temporary breach,
provided the breach did not contribute to the loss. Worthington v. Bearse,
12 Allen (Mass.), 382; Lane v. Ins. Co., 12 Me., 44. This class of cases
seems to follow the equitable doctrine that equity abhors forfeitures. There
is another class of cases which hold that any breach of condition abso-
lutely defeats all rights under the policy provided there has not been a
waiver of breach of conditions by the insurer. Mead v. Ins. Co., 7 N. Y.,
530; Kyte v. Assurance Co., 149 Mass.; 116. In this class of cases the
courts enforce the contract according to the intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in the contract. This appears to be the better view and the one
followed by the weight of authority.
PARENT AND CHILD-PROSECUTION FOR NON-SIUPPORT-DEFENSE.-STATE
v. BESS, 137 PAC. (UTAH), 829.-Held, in a prosecution of a father for
failure to support his minor children, in violation of a statute which pro-
vided "that any person who shall without just excuse desert or wilfully
neglect or refuse to provide for the support of his or her minor child or
children under the age of sixteen years, in destitute or necessitous cir-
cumstances, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," etc., it was no de-
fense that the destitution of the children was relieved by the charitable
acts of third persons. It appeared that the complaining witness, wife of
the defendant, had obtained custody of the children by a decree of divorce,
which was granted for the fault of the defendant and which made no pro-
vision for support.
It may be remarked that the father's primary civil liability to support
minor children remains unchanged by a divorce decree, unless there be a
specific order of court, Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me., 292; Zilley v. Dunwiddie,
98 Wis., 428, and by the weight of authority this is true though the wife
accepts custody. Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn., 56; Gilson v. Gilson, 18
Wash., 489; Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St., 452; Zilley v. Dunwid-
die, supra; Peck on Dor. Rel., par. 110; see Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn., 411,
contra; Mall v. Gree.n, 82 Me., 122; Brow v. Brightman, 136 Mass., 187.
Also, the prevailing rule accords with the principal case and holds that it
is a violation of such statutes to fail to support minor children (or a wife)
regardless of whether they are supported and kept from actual destitu-
tion by the labor of the wife or by charity. Poole v. People, 24 Colo., 510;
People v. Malsch, 119 Mich., 112; State v. Witham, 70 Wis., 473; Burton
v. Comm., 109 Va., 800; State v. Waller, 90 Kan., 829; State v. Stouffer,
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65 Ohio St., 47; State v. Sutcliffe, 18 R. 1., 53; Beilfus v. State, 142 Wis.,
665. The phrase "destitute and necessituous circumstances" has been held
to mean not only things absolutely indispensible to human existence, but
things in fact necessary to the particular person. See State v. Waller,
supra; Burton v. Comm., supra. And it has been held that even though
the wife agrees to support the minor children for a valuable consideration,
yet this is no defense to an action against the father for non-support;
Bowen v. State, 56 Ohio St., 235; nor does the fact that he agrees to sup-
port them if the wife will deliver up custody relieve him, though they
were improperly detained by the wife. State v. Sutcliffe, supra; Beilfus
v. State, supra. These courts consider that the purpose of the statute is
to secure the performance of the husband's or father's obligation and to
provide a remedy for the wife or children in addition to those afforded by
civil proceedings. State v. Waller, supra; Burton v. Comm., supra. "Thus,"
says the Michigan court, "they are clearly distinguishable 'from statutes
which are designed to redress public grievances." People v. Malsch, supra.
In these latter statutes an injury to the public (i. e., in leaving the children
actually destitute) is an essential ingredient of the offense. See People v.
Walsh, 11 Hun., 292; Bayne v. People, 14 Hun., 181; State v. Watson, 58
N. J. L., 499. And since such statutes are highly penal, they are to be
strictly construed. Goetting v. Norinoyle, 191 N. Y., 368. Other courts,
notably those of Georgia, have adopted a contrary view to that of the case
under discussion, and hold that actual deprivation of food and clothing is
a prerequisite to the father's liability; Dalton v. Siate, 188 Ga., 196;
Williams v. State, 126 Ga., 637; Baldwin v. State, 188 Ga., 328; Richie v.
Comm., 44 S. W., 979; State v. Thornton, 232 Mo., 298; and that art cles
of necessity are what the child actually needs, not what may be classed as
per se a necessity. State v. Thornton, supra. This difference of opinion
seems to arise from the question as to whether these statutes are to be
regarded as penal and consequently strictly construed; see Morin v. New-
berry, 79 Conn., 338; Schulte v. Menke, 111 Ill. App., 212; People v. Wein-
stock, 193 N. Y., 481; or as remedial, and for the protection of rights, in
which case a more liberal interpretation should be given. See Harrison v.
Monmouth Bank, 207 Ill., 630; Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn., 597; Boston Mill
Corp v. Gardner, 2 Pick., 33. It is submitted that the latter view, that of
the principal case, is correct, and that the purpose of these statutes is not
so much the punishment of the father as the support of the child. A lib-
eral construction will aid in attaining the this object.
RAILROADs-ACTIONS FOR INJURIES-EVIDENCE.-CHABOTT v. GRAND
TRUNK Ry. Co., 88 ATL. (N. H.), 995.-Evidence that a person injured was
in the habit of looking and listening before stepping upon or walking
along a railroad track is admissible to show whether he looked and lis-
tened at a particular time, upon the ground that a person is more apt to do
a thing in the manner in which he is in the habit of doing it.
Habit is customary conduct, to pursue which a person has acquired a
tendency, from frequent repetition of the same act. Insurance Co. v. Foley,
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105 U. S., 350. Evidence of a custom on the part of pedestrians to walk
on the railroad is not admissible as evidence against the railroad company
in an action to recover for the death of a person who was killed while on
the track. M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Womack, Adnrx., 84 Ala., 149. But the
fact that inmates of dwelling houses along a railroad are in the habit ot
using the tracks as a public walk to and from their homes is evidence
tending to charge the company with notice that the tracks opposite these
dwellings are in use as a walk by those who have occasion to use them.
Wabash R. Co. v. Jones, 53 Ill. App., 125; Eckert v. St. Louis & R. R. Co.,
13 Mo. App., 352. Where there is conflicting testimony whether a certain
act was or was not done evidence of the person's habits with respect to
acts of that particular character is admissible as to whether an attorney
did or did not give certain instructions to the sheriff to whom he delivered
a writ to be served, the uniform habit and course of business of the attor-
ney before and at the time of issuing writs was admissible as evidence that
the attorney did not give the instructions. Hine v. Pomeroy, 39 Vt., 211.
Evidence of the usual custom of a notary in cases of protest to .send writ-
ten notice of dishonor by mail where the parties lived at a distance, was
sufficient to support the averment of due notice of dishonor to the en-
dorsee. Miller v. Hackley, 5 Johns, 375. The invariable custom of a clerk
to mail letters copied into a letter book, was sufficient evidence of sending
the letter. Thollhimer v. Buncherhoff, 9 Cow., 90. The invariable practice
of a porter to present checks for payment and to return those dishonored
on the same day he received them is sufficient proof of presentment to
authorize the submission of the case to the jury. Merchants Bank v.
Spicer, 6 Wend. (N. Y.), 443. While the rule has been followed in New
Hampshire, it has not been so widely followed in other jurisdictions. The
theory of the rule is doubtless sound, and when wisely applied serves to
do justice between the parties.
